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This  article traces  the history of the project for a  Regional Express  Railway (RER) from, towards, in and around Brussels  by high-
lighting the major conflicts between the different stakeholders which have underlain the issue from the start. The RER is  at the heart 
of rivalries regarding the uses, users  and visions of the city to be favoured, as  well as  the concrete mobility policies  to develop and 
the role of the Société Nationale des  Chemins  de 
fer Belges  (SNCB) in this respect. The article also 
traces  the different steps  in the political regulation 
of the issue, covering the phases  of progress  and 
standstill which mark out the history of the RER. By 
shedding light on the history of these rivalries  and 
antagonisms which have never lost their substance, 
this  article provides  a better view of the current 
situation, illustrating the power of misunderstand-
ings.
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1. The Brussels-Capital Region (BCR) is  often presented as a city-
region which is  being asphyxiated by car traffic. Since the creation of 
BCR in 1989, this problem has  been at the centre of political and socie-
tal debates. The mobility problem in Brussels is  complex for several 
reasons. The Region is  confronted with a  policy promoting the ‘su-
premacy of the car’ [Hubert, 2008], which existed well before its  crea-
tion and which greatly influenced the urban space since the end of the 
1950s by accelerating urban sprawl. This  urban sprawl and the attrac-
tion of the capital in terms of employment have resulted in a particularly 
high number of daily long-distance commuters, to the point of being 
referred to as  a ‘society of commuters’ [Montulet, et al., 2008]. The 
phenomenon of the commute – initially by train and then by car – was 
favoured by the public authorities  and embodies  ‘a constituent element 
of the urbanisation of Belgium and Brussels  in particular.’ [Dessouroux, 
2008, p. 4] The mobility problem in Brussels  is  also confronted with the 
fact that the Region, in the same way as  Wallonia and Flanders, is 
competent in its  territory regarding public transport, but other levels  of 
authority also play significant roles  in this respect. The federal level 
manages  the Société nationale des chemins  de fer belges  (SNCB) and 
the municipal level manages certain roads  and adopts  a  municipal mo-
bility plan. The scattering of competence [Aussems, 2009] makes the 
management of mobility all the more complex since – in addition to the 
stacking of levels  of authority – the scale of problems must be taken 
into account, which rarely corresponds to the institutional boundaries  of 
the territories, as well as  the complexity of a phenomenon which goes 
beyond the question of travel. Resolving the mobility issue in Brussels 
involves going beyond the territorial boundaries  of the Region, the insti-
tutional boundaries of regional competence and sectoral divisions.
2. In this context, the idea of creating a Regional Express Railway 
(RER) from, towards, in and around Brussels  has gradually spread. In 
this  article, we shall look at some of the major challenges with respect 
to the RER by highlighting the way in which they have been shaped by 
certain stakeholders. The socio-historical perspective allows an under-
standing of the emergence and depth of the social phenomena and the 
way in which they have been constructed and placed on the agenda as 
a ‘public problem’ [Noiriel, 2006; Damay et al., 2011]. We shall thus 
show how, since the beginning of the project, the RER has been at the 
heart of many conflicts regarding use, visions  of the city and concrete 
mobility policies  to be implemented. These conflicts have a strong influ-
ence on the political regulation area surrounding RER regulation, which 
we shall examine afterwards. Negotiated forms of governance have 
been implemented in view of building this ‘new’ public transport net-
work, nevertheless certain obstacles  appear to be inextricable. Given 
the political deadlock and budget deficit, the RER project has even 
been overtaken by and in competition with other alternative railway 
network projects  which have recently been brought into the public 
sphere. 
1. The RER: complex rivalries
3. Other projects existed before the RER, such as  the métropolitain 
project in the 1920s and 1930s  [Van Meerteen, et al., 2002, p. 32]. As 
of 1968, the draft project for the 1976 sector plan also included an out-
line of the RER as  an addition to the underground [Tellier, 2012, p. 185]. 
1
1 This article was written in the framework of a research project entitled ‘Prospective Research for Brussels’, financed by the Brussels-Capital Region (BCR) between January 2011 and 
June 2013. The study focuses on the stakeholders of the RER issue in Brussels, though other perspectives are not rejected. The results discussed here are based on a documentary 
analysis (parliamentary debate reports, newspaper articles, association memoranda, consultancy firm reports, RER piloting committee reports, etc.) and on the realisation of semi-
structured interviews (20) with key stakeholders in the area. We wish to thank the anonymous readers of this paper for their comments on the project, as well as Kevin Lebrun, Michel Hu-
bert and Benjamin Wayens.
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There were also local demands (or rather, concerns) for three-track 
lines in order to serve certain municipalities  of Brussels better in the mid 
1970s.2  That being said, the main stakeholders involved agree that it 
was  towards  the end of the 1980s that the project became part of the 
public debate under the combined influence of two events. Firstly, in 
December 1988, Stratec (a independent consulting firm created in 
1984) submitted its final report to SNCB, sponsor of a study seeking to 
improve the company’s  market share towards  Brussels. The conclu-
sions  of the study were incontestable: the market share of SNCB  was 
decreasing in a  37.5 km radius  around Brussels  while this  ring consti-
tuted the greatest potential as a major pool of commuters. Following 
this, the authors  asked SNCB to ‘partially replace the current inter-
urban offer by a suburban offer [...]; [...] along its urban route this  type 
of service would also attract some intra-urban and suburban travel [...] 
and would thus  make a positive contribution to the improvement of 
urban public transport in Brussels’.3 While the report does  not mention 
the acronym ‘RER’, it outlines  its  objectives which match the commer-
cial intentions  of SNCB, which was losing momentum at the time. 
SNCB began working on this  theme and, as  it stated,4 a  more precise 
plan was  drawn up for a future suburban network like the Paris  RER. 
The Star 21 plan, presented by SNCB  in 1989, also announced the 
densification ‘of a suburban network’ ensuring ‘frequent service for 
Brussels’.5 The public corporation backed down, however, mentioning 
technical and financial problems  on several occasions. Secondly, how-
ever, the RER was also the focus  of other discussions, in the first BCR 
electoral campaign in June 1989. Several parties referred to this net-
work, with the subject of traffic congestion in the background. ‘The 
asphyxiation of Brussels’ is  a  subject which has  become more impor-
tant in politics, presented by the media  in a catastrophic perspective. 
Since the implementation of the Region, there has been a need for a 
mobility plan for Brussels (the future IRIS plan)  which would place great 
emphasis on public transport, such as  the train. Many stakeholders  in 
Brussels  point out the political will of the minister for Public Works and 
Communications, Jean-Louis Thys, and his cabinet regarding the RER. 
That being said, as  regards  the ecological opposition at the Brussels 
first regional executive, despite the discourse ‘there are consensuses – 
such as that regarding cars – which are difficult to break’.6 The role of 
the car in the city is  one of the major elements which have influenced 
the rivalries  since that time, but it is  not the only one. We shall present 
three major debates which structure and mark out the existence and 
progress of the RER project. 
1.1. Rivalries between uses
4. Who would use the RER? What types of use would be favoured? 
What would its  effects  be on mobility as  well as  on the residential 
strategies  of households  as well as  the strategies  of economic stake-
holders? There have been heated debates regarding these questions 
since the beginning of the project. While Brussels  policies  take the lead 
in promoting the RER by taking certain initiatives  in terms of negotiation 
or publicisation of the stakes, their position is far from being unani-
mous. 
5. For certain politicians, the RER must of course respond to the 
phenomenon of commuting by car by causing a modal shift from the 
car to the train, but it must also solve the problem of internal mobility in 
2
2 HENROTIN, A., ‘Le plan star 21 inquiète la population proche de la Ligne 161. Le spectre du RER hante Boitsfort.’, Le Soir, 10 May 1991, p. 22.
3 STRATEC, Etude de la desserte ferroviaire de Bruxelles et environ, final report for SNCB, 5 December 1988, p. 31.
4 VANTROYEN, J-C., ‘Le chemin de fer pour éviter l’asphyxie de la capitale’, Le Soir, 29 May 1989.
5 DEPAS, G., ‘Star 21 : répondre au 21ème siècle (détails du projet de la SNCB)’, Le Soir, 13 November 1989, p. 4. 
6 BCR Council, Compte rendu intégral, plenary session of Thursday 13 July 1989, p. 44.
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Brussels  by serving users  in Brussels. The Brussels  executive criticises 
the intentions  of SNCB  which ‘does not take internal mobility in Brus-
sels  into account’.7 In addition to the existing service, the Brussels  ex-
ecutive suggests  promoting two lines towards  the west and the east of 
Brussels  as a  prefiguration of the RER, supporting the development of 
internal mobility by allowing better accessibility of out-of-the-way areas 
which do not fully benefit from the current railway network which 
passes  mainly through the North-South junction. The promotion of in-
ternal mobility in Brussels does not necessarily please the other Re-
gions, firstly because they would like to favour the quickest possible 
service to the centre of Brussels  for their commuters, and secondly 
because they see it as  a  sort of hold-up of federal financing. The Flem-
ish opinion, for example, was expressed in 1992, via the minister for 
transport: ‘If we analyse the current situation, we have the impression 
that the Brussels-Capital Region wishes  to resolve its  problems  through 
the commitment of others and through a  drain on the budget at federal 
level, or at the level of the Flemish Region and Walloon Region.’8 It is 
clear that for the other Regions as well as for SNCB, which sees  an 
interest in terms  of market shares, commuters  are the main potential 
users. Perhaps paradoxically, some politicians in Brussels  agree that, 
fundamentally, the RER is not a matter for the inhabitants  of Brussels. 
‘The Flemish and the Walloons who live within a 30-kilometre radius of 
Brussels  need a Regional Express  Railway. The inhabitants of Brussels 
will only use it occasionally. There is therefore no reason why the Brus-
sels  Region should be mainly responsible for the construction of a net-
work which may result in the exodus of more of its  inhabitants.’9  The 
objective is  above all to avoid having to take on a  large part of its  po-
tential financing.
6. Another element of the debate is mentioned in the above citation: 
what if, above all, the RER emptied Brussels of its  inhabitants? Accord-
ing to some, the RER may increase the urban exodus  of wealthy 
households  by providing a quick and frequent means to reach the em-
ployment poles  in Brussels, a quality of life which is  supposedly more 
pleasant in the Walloon or Flemish ‘countryside’ and a  more attractive 
real estate market. The urban sprawl debate is  on the whole a classic 
one. The fear of seeing the inhabitants of Brussels  flee the city thanks 
to this  network has  existed since the beginning of the project.10  The 
RER is seen as  a  worthwhile yet destabilising service, with the potential 
to prompt more people to leave. This  argument is supported in the 
demographic context of Brussels  (which has changed greatly since): 
between 1971 and 1991, BCR has  lost 11 percent of its  population 
while the outskirts  have increased in population by 20 percent. The 
RER is  therefore described as  the worst thing for a  Region which is  also 
under-financed due to taxes based on place of residence. The Atelier 
de Recherche et d’Action Urbaines (ARAU) has continued to be par-
ticularly critical with respect to the impact of the RER on Brussels  and 
‘urban habitability’ [Schoonbrodt, 2007]. Studies  modelling the influ-
ence of the RER on the location of households  later confirmed the risk 
of exodus  [Boon and Gayda, 2000]. Some Brussels  politicians  got their 
fingers  burnt by what could be related to the transformation of the 
‘[...] capital into an area  of use which pushes the legitimate expecta-
tions  of inhabitants and the quality of their living conditions  into the 
background’.11  In order to counter this  exodus, the RER project must 
tackle the supremacy of the car, in particular through support meas-
ures. We shall return to this. 
3
7 ALSTEENS, O., ‘Le plan Star 21 de Mr Dehaene a oublié les Bruxellois’, Le Soir, 21 April 1990, p. 10.
8 SAUWENS, J., Ministre communautaire des Transports, du Commerce extérieur et de la Réforme de l’Etat, Le RER à toute vitesse, proceedings of the round table of 5 June 1992, Brus-
sels, p. 5.
9 TELLIER, D., ‘Le SP appuie le plan Transport SNCB. Le RER n’est pas l’affaire des Bruxellois’, Le Soir, 1 August 1997, p. 4.
10 Council of the Brussels-Capital Region, Bulletin des interpellations et des questions orales et d’actualité, 13 March 1992, p. 197.
11 Charles Picqué, Pour Bruxelles. Entre périls et espoirs, Brussels, Editions Racine, 1999, p. 123. 
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1.2. Rivalries with respect to visions of the city
7. Behind these positions favouring the inhabitants  of Brussels and 
commuters, throughout the historical sociology of the RER, different 
visions  of the city or different references which guide the various  posi-
tions have also appeared. Is  Brussels  a  hyper-concentrated city, with 
offices centred round the main stations  of the North-South junction 
and the European Quarter? Or is  Brussels  a city which must return to 
its  inhabitants  who have already paid a high price for railway devel-
opment? These different images of the city are found in the concrete 
proposals which prefigure the future RER. If we caricature the debate 
only slightly, the Walloons  and the Flemish wish to access the centre 
of Brussels  as quickly as possible, via the North-South junction or the 
European Quarter. There should be many stations  in their respective 
territory, yet there must only be a limited number in the Brussels  terri-
tory, in order not to increase travel time with useless  stops  [Frenay, 
2009]. It is also out of the question to have trains  serve less  important 
poles, such as  the West Station. Brussels is  therefore limited to its 
very centre and the European Quarter; it is  a  city of commuters with a 
few employment poles. In contrast, BCR attempts to maximise the 
number of stations  in its territory and to favour the more harmonious 
use of an existing railway network for internal mobility in Brussels. It 
would thus  free its underground network, which is also saturated in 
the central areas. That being said, the positions are more complex 
than they appear. For example, the 1995 Regional Development Plan, 
through its  ABC policy, is  aimed at positioning tertiary sector activities 
in ‘the main public transport hubs’ (North, South, Arts-Loi, Schuman, 
etc.)  [Hubert, et al. 2008; de Keersmaecker, 2005]. A great many 
concerns  also exist in Brussels, among others, regarding the destruc-
tive potential of RER infrastructures, and in particular the creation of 
four-track lines,  for the existing urban fabric. Certain municipalities 
and certain cooperatives (associations which promote causes  such as 
alternative mobility or groups  of local residents) therefore slow down 
the progress of the project12  or question the opportunity to connect 
their territory to the west of Brussels, rather than the centre.13 
8. Much more recently, the image of Brussels as  a ‘polycentric’ city 
has  emerged, above all in the political debates  concerning the last 
development plan for Brussels  – the Sustainable Regional Develop-
ment Plan – whose draft was approved after a first reading by the 
Brussels  government on 26 September 2013. This polycentric nature 
is  based on the fact that the centre is  not necessarily at the origin or 
the destination of the journeys  made in the city and that it is  therefore 
necessary to densify and favour urban mix around intermodal hubs. 
That being said, certain analysts  criticise the purely rhetorical use of 
this term without any concrete measures  being put into practice 
[Casabella and Frenay, 2009]. 
9. Other images of the city also compete in terms  of the references 
used in negotiation or in public debates. The RER may thus  contrib-
ute to making the city ‘breathable’ and to developing ‘sustainable’ 
mobility, as the ‘means of transportation which is  the most respectful 
of the environment’.14 The RER should favour the modal shift from the 
car to alternative means of transport, a transfer announced as  a po-
litical objective in the IRIS 1 and IRIS 2 mobility plans  for BCR. The 
environmental associations in the three Regions are generally in favour 
of this network15  with the implementation of support measures, the 
4
12 SCHOUNE, C., ‘Uccle-Stalle réaiguille les plans du RER’, Le Soir, 10 May 2000 and http://www.uccle.be/fr/services-communaux/urbanisme/rer-1 (consulted on 23/12/2013).
13 ‘SNCB has just presented a provisional outline for the operation of the RER. While this will improve access for commuters to Brussels, it will not favour travel within Brussels by train. 
This is why, in Uccle, line 124 (which serves the stations of Linkebeek, Calevoet and Stalle) will no longer go to the South Station but to the West Station in Molenbeek. Although the con-
cern to lighten the North-South junction is understandable, it is unacceptable to Marc Cools, Uccle Deputy Burgomaster of Works and Mobility.’ (http://www.marccools.be/region.html, 
consulted on 23/12/2013) 
14 BOVY, L., ‘RER : un projet de mobilité nécessaire’, Presentation at the Economic and Social Council, 28 October 2010.
15 See for example: Inter-environnement Wallonie, avis d’IEW sur le RER, 1 September 2004. 
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decrease in pollution for local residents  and, for the inhabitants of 
Brussels, the taking into account of internal mobility in Brussels. In 
addition to the image of Brussels  as  ‘eco capital’ [IRIS 2, p. 18], 
thanks to the resulting modal shift, the RER could also ensure better 
access to the economic poles  and to companies. It is paradoxical 
that by reducing car traffic, the RER would allow the remaining vehi-
cles  to move more freely, which is  an important argument for certain 
stakeholders, as  expressed by the different social partners  in the three 
Regions.16 The same is true for Brussels as ‘economic capital’. 
1.3. Rivalries regarding mobility policies
10. The RER also gives rise to socio-technical controversies  regard-
ing the concrete policies  to implement, their level of feasibility and 
their potential effects. The least we can say is  that with respect to 
these challenges, SNCB-Holding leads, to the extent that it is  the 
owner of the railway infrastructure (via its subsidiary Infrabel), project 
manager for works  connected with its  network and railway traffic op-
erator (via the operator SNCB). The monopolistic situation of the pub-
lic corporation in railway regulation has often been criticised: it was 
blamed several times for blocking the project. The media pointed out 
that, according to SNCB, since the beginning of the project ‘the exist-
ing infrastructure cannot be used due to the incompatibility of signals, 
power and traffic flow’.17  It admits  that the RER is  not its  ‘core busi-
ness’, which would be the case for regional transport companies. As 
a national company, it has less interest in suburban railway develop-
ment and favours  its  IC/IR plan (between cities  and regions) and in-
ternational development. Other imperatives  mentioned in the debate 
by SNCB which have an impact on policies  are transport security, the 
robustness  of the network, profitability and service speed. There is 
suspicion regarding its actions: SNCB has accepted the RER be-
cause this project would allow it to increase its  capacities  in terms  of 
infrastructures  (the creation of four-track lines, the Schuman-Josaphat 
tunnel) in favour of the robustness of its network.18 
11. But the debate regarding mobility policies is not limited to the 
infrastructures  to be built and the operating schedule of the RER. 
Several studies indicate that the RER will not solve mobility problems 
if drastic support measures are not taken, on the one hand, aimed at 
making the train more attractive by penalising the use of the car in 
different ways (such as  parking policy, lane reduction or the imple-
mentation of urban charging)  and on the other hand, at gambling on 
mobility demands  via a  land-use planning policy favouring density and 
urban development around poles which benefit from better public 
transport service. The support measures are linked to urban exodus 
and urban sprawl. In addition to the first study mentioned above 
[Boon and Gayda, 2000] conducted from 1996 to 1998, other studies 
from 2002 and 2003  indicate the extent to which urban exodus will be 
facilitated if certain support measures  are not taken.19 It is  not surpris-
ing that after these studies, the increase in the public transport offer 
will not be enough to check urban exodus: the supremacy of the car 
must be dealt with via mechanisms such as urban charging and park-
ing restrictions.20 BCR will fight to impose these support measures on 
other stakeholders, finding them more necessary than the other Re-
gions  do. However, it is  not enough for the other Regions to build car 
parks around future RER stations; BCR and its 19 municipalities  must 
also adopt coherent measures  in terms of roads, parking and priority 
to public transport, which they have still not done. 
5
16 Joint statement by SERV, CESRBC and CESRW, Le Réseau Express Régional, 27 June 2006.
17 BOURTON, W., ‘Trois lettres : RER comme SOS’, Le Soir, 22 January 1992, p. 20
18 BCR Council document, Bulletin des interpellations et questions orales et d’actualités, Commission de l’infrastructure, chargée des travaux publics et des communications, 18 March 
1998, BIQ (1997-1998) N°19, p. 8.
19 STRATEC, Evaluation et optimisation des mesures d’accompagnement du RER desservant l’agglomération centre sur la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale, section 1 final report and section 
2 final report, October 2002 and October 2003, for the federal office for mobility and transport.
20 Ibid., p. 92; p. 55. 
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2. The RER: attempts at political regulation
2.1. Agenda, coalitions and expertise (1989-1998)
12. These structural antagonisms  have continued throughout the his-
torical sociology of the RER. Several phases  may be defined in the 
elaboration and implementation of this project. The first decade from 
1989 to 1999 is characterised, on the one hand, by the will of political 
stakeholders  in Brussels  who did not cease to give the project visibility 
and rally other stakeholders  and, on the other hand, by the importance 
of building up expertise in this  area. The ‘Task Force pour l’amélioration 
de la  desserte ferroviaire de Bruxelles’21 was  an initiative of the Brussels 
minister for public transport in 1991, gathering the different parties  with 
the objective to start with ‘the upgrading of line 26’ and then to ‘make 
an inventory of issues  shared by SNCB and STIB  in view of favouring 
the realisation of a  RER network.’22 The strategy of Jean-Louis  Thys’ 
cabinet, like that of Brussels  ministers  who succeeded him in support 
of the RER, seems to have been to involve the other stakeholders, in-
side (and above all)  outside the Region so that the RER would not ap-
pear to be a demand coming only from Brussels. In June 1992, the first 
round table on the RER was  organised. It was  called – with a twist of 
irony – ‘Le RER à toute vitesse’23 (‘The RER at top speed’). During this 
conference, the other political stakeholders such as  Flanders, were reti-
cent (see above). However, the creation of this  Task Force resulted in 
the creation of the ‘Syndicat d’études pour le RER’ in June 1993. This 
was  once again an initiative of BCR.24  The mission of this  research 
committee was  to propose a network, by giving priority to the existing 
6
21 BCR Council document, Rapport fait au nom de la commission de l’infrastructure, chargée des travaux publics et des communications. Réseau Express Régional (RER), Brussels, 8 May 
1996, document A85/1~95-96, annexe 1 (Synthèse du RER project), p. 34.
22 BCR Council, full report, plenary session of Thursday 13 June 1991.
23 ‘Le RER à toute vitesse’, proceedings of the round table of 5 June 1992, Brussels. 
24 REBUFFAT, J., ‘La Région paie 35 millions pour une étude sur le futur RER’, Le Soir, 3 April 1993, p. 30
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infrastructure, programming future investments  and specifying the roll-
ing stock to acquire, the investment costs and operation costs. It re-
quested the services of a French consultancy firm, SOFRETU, special-
ised in the design of public transport networks. Surrounded by other 
subcontracting firms, this  research committee submitted a  first report in 
1995, often referred to as the ‘Sofretu study’.25 
13. Still in the perspective of building favourable configurations  of 
stakeholders, a second round table was  organised on 12 March 1996, 
gathering 300 people.26  According to some, this was when the two 
other Regions  began to support the RER project:27 ‘A network project 
was  thus  presented [...] and was  the object of a wide consensus.’28 For 
others, such as  the federal minister Michel Daerden, the approaches 
diverged and illustrated the ‘community’29 character of the issue, which 
must not be presented as an ‘irreversible gain’.30 The SNCB  ten-year 
plan’,31  which was finally approved in July 1996,32  does not mention 
the realisation of the RER as  a  priority. The RER research committee 
submitted a second report in January 1998, its  ‘final report’ presenting 
a RER project which constituted 'a  network centred mainly round the 
junction'.33  The project was criticised by certain politicians  in Brussels, 
in particular because it abandoned line 28 and did not take the recom-
mendations  of the BCR Council adopted in May 1996 into considera-
tion. Meanwhile, SNCB adopted its  new transport plan which came into 
force in May 1998. While this  plan greatly benefited long-distance 
commuters, it neglected ‘the suburbanites, i.e. the connections at less 
7
25 COMITE DE PILOTAGE CONVENTION RER of 04/04/2003 (MB 01/03/2006), annual report 2006-2007.
26 BCR Council Document, Rapport fait au nom de la commission de l’infrastructure, chargée des travaux publics et des communications. Réseau Express Régional (RER), Brussels, 8 
May 1996, document A85/1~95-96.
27 Ibid., presentation by minister Hervé HASQUIN, p. 4. 
28 BCR Council document, Bulletin des interpellations et questions orales et d’actualités, Commission de l’infrastructure, chargée des travaux publics et des communications, 18 March 
1998, BIQ (1997-1998) N°19, p. 3
29 Belgian House of Representatives, Commission de l’Infrastructure, des Communications et des Entreprises Publiques, 20 March 1996, C105, p. 4.
30 Minister Daerden, ibid., p. 21
31 Plan décennal 1996-2005 pour le transport de demain: STAR 21, SNCB, 1996.
32 Troisième avenant au premier contrat de gestion de la SNCB. Published in the Moniteur belge on 29 October 1996.
33 BCR Council document, Bulletin des interpellations et questions orales et d’actualités, Commission de l’infrastructure, chargée des travaux publics et des communications, 18 March 
1998, BIQ (1997-1998) N°19
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than 30 kilometres around Brussels. The new offer is  fundamentally not 
in keeping with the idea of the RER [...]'.34 
14. For Brussels  politicians, the final report by the research committee 
must be the object of a cooperation agreement between the three Re-
gions and federal level. While BCR clearly made contacts in this  direc-
tion,35  the RER project entered a latent phase. It was  more than one 
year later, in March 1999, that the Conférence Interministérielle des 
Communications  et de l'Infrastructure (CICI)  declared itself in favour of 
the realisation of the RER and the creation of a working group, called 
the ‘high-level RER group’, appointed to study (once again) the condi-
tions  of the realisation of the RER and to create a draft cooperation 
agreement between the federal authority and the three Regions. 
2.2. Institutionalisation and the beginning of implementation 
(1999-2008)
15. The following decade was more of an important phase of deci-
sions, which institutionalised the project despite several obstacles  and 
also led to the implementation – at least partial – of the infrastructures 
required for its  realisation. Following the June 1999 legislative elections, 
the governmental declaration mentioned the necessity to create the 
RER.36  In 2000, a  new interministerial conference started up the work 
of the ‘high-level RER group’ once again and gave it the task of creat-
ing a cooperation project and agreement.37  At the end of this  same 
year, the RER fund was created to cover part of the investments  in 
infrastructures.38 The federal level worked on the production of a RER 
report and proposed a future RER agreement to be negotiated with the 
Regions. The opinion of the SNCB board of directors  was required, 
however, and it was  not until March 2001 that it expressed a favourable 
opinion concerning the RER project, included in the budget of the 
2001-2012 ten-year investment plan. SNCB  was  reluctant, however, 
often declaring that it no longer had the funds to invest in this  project, 
causing a ‘trial of strength’ with the political world, which denounced 
the ‘freezing’ of the project.39 The political stakeholders  in Brussels who 
were still very proactive regarding this issue, were also concerned 
about the lack of a cooperation agreement, which finally took shape in 
the agreement of 4 April 2003  aimed at implementing the programme 
for a  RER from, towards, in and around Brussels, established by the 
federal state and the three Regions.40
16. The contents  of the RER project for Brussels  may be summarised 
in three points: the realisation of a  certain number of railway infrastruc-
tures  (creation of four-track lines for several lines, development and 
creation of stations, etc.) and road infrastructures  (development of bus 
connections);  the development of methods  of operation for this  infra-
structure (including the operating schedule and the purchase of rolling 
stock);  and the implementation of ‘support measures’, defined in the 
2003  agreement as  ‘any action whose objective is  to favour the use of 
public transport in the RER area (the parking policy and the construc-
tion of car parks, the hierarchical organisation of roads  in the city, the 
improvement of intermodality conditions, etc.). The agreement also cre-
ated a certain number of ad hoc coordination bodies to ensure negotia-
8
34 TELLIER, D., ‘Le SP appuie le plan Transport SNCB. Le RER n’est pas l’affaire des Bruxellois’, Le Soir, 1 August 1997, p. 4.
35 BCR Council document, Bulletin des interpellations et questions orales et d’actualités, Commission de l’infrastructure, chargée des travaux publics et des communications, 18 March 
1998, BIQ (1997-1998) N°19, p. 7.
36 Belgian House of Representatives, Annales, plenary session of 14/07/1999, p. 48.
37 COMITE DE PILOTAGE CONVENTION RER of 04/04/2003, Annual report 2006-2007, p. 6
38 COMITE DE PILOTAGE CONVENTION RER of 04/04/2003, Annual report 2006-2007, p. 6
39 See for example: Demonty, B., Dewez, A., ‘Le patron de la SNCB affirme qu’il n’a pas de moyens pour entreprendre les travaux RER : bras de fer Vinck-Durant’, Le Soir, 8 February 
2003, p. 33; Demonty, B., ‘La ministre des transports n’est toujours pas satisfaite. Un peu d’argent pour le RER’, Le Soir, 15 February 2003, p. 31.
40 Agreement of 4 April 2003 aimed implementing the Regional Express Railway programme from, towards, in and around Brussels. This agreement was the object of a law adopted on 17 
June 2005 and published in the Moniteur belge on 1 March 2006.
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tions  between the parties. In addition to the Comité Exécutif des  Minis-
tres de la Mobilité (CEMM), made up of the four ministers  with mobility 
within their remit, the agreement established the ‘RER piloting commit-
tee’, made up of the different administrations  and transport companies, 
as well as ‘the operational group’, which was a more technical group 
associating only representatives of the four public transport companies. 
17. The piloting committee is  in charge of the general follow-up of the 
agreement and is  a  central group in the management of negotiations. 
The committee took up its  functions  in April 2006, and was in charge of 
the follow-up of a study provided for in article 13  of the agreement, 
centred on travel needs  and functionality requirements  regarding fre-
quency, scope and stations, i.e. the ‘operating schedule’ of the RER. At 
the beginning of 2008, this  study was entrusted to an association of 
consultancy firms  and was the object of discussions within the piloting 
committee as  it progressed. The study report from June 2009 presents 
an intermediate scenario for the implementation of the RER in 2015, 
but it also proposes  a scenario for 2020 and another for 2030. These 
scenarios have not undergone in-depth study from a technical point of 
view but have the political advantage of being more in keeping with the 
competing demands of the Regions. While the activity report of the 
consulting firms was approved in order to close the deal, the contents 
of the report have not been officially accepted by the piloting commit-
tee, the Regions, federal level or SNCB. 
18. The RER project materialised as of 2004 with the beginning (from 
Schuman to Watermael, for example) of the first infrastructure works, 
which required the realisation of impact assessment studies  and the 
obtaining – not without difficulty – of certificates  and planning permis-
sion. The rolling stock was also the object of a contract in April 2008 
with Siemens, for the purchase of 305 Desiro ML trains, 95 of which 
would be used for the RER. This material was therefore not specifically 
9
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Figure 1. A SNCB  Siemens  Desiro ML train,  already in service as  an IR train, 
seen  here at the Antwerp Central Station. Source: photo Alfenaar via Flickr/
Wikimedia, Creative Commons - certain rights reserved.
Figure 2. Interior (second class) of a SNCB  Siemens  Desiro ML train  already in 
service. Note the density of the layout and the lack of tables.  Source: photo Mau-
rits90 via Wikimedia, Creative Commons - certain rights reserved.
dedicated to the RER, which gave critics  reason to believe that the 
transport operator's  strategy was  to benefit from this acquisition in-
tended for its  'traditional' network. Despite this progress, the RER pro-
ject once again reached an institutional deadlock. 
2.3. Obstacles and alternatives (2009 - ) 
19. Since 2009, many obstacles  have appeared along the route of the 
RER. The approval of the operating schedule proposed by the ‘article 
13’ study, was  stopped by the regional elections, the implementation of 
new cabinets, and then by the biggest institutional crisis ever experi-
enced in Belgium, with the lack of a federal government. In 2010, Infra-
bel also announced the delay in putting the RER into operation due to 
the legal saga related to the obtaining of permits  at Linkebeek: instead 
of 2016, Infrabel spoke of 2019 or 2020 as  the year in which the serv-
ice would be operational.41  In 2012, the deadline was estimated to be 
2022 for the same reasons. While it looked as though the RER had 
‘come out of hibernation’ in May 2012, following a first meeting of mo-
bility ministers  under the aegis of the new Federal Mobility Secretary, 
there had been no formal approval of the operating schedule. The pilot-
ing group had not been able to achieve this  either due to political op-
position regarding the choices  made with respect to the favoured uses 
of the RER as  well as a more ‘technical’ opposition by SNCB, which felt 
that the 2015 intermediate scenario was  unfeasible, considering the 
current use (and not the situation in 2008) and the entire network (and 
not a model which it felt would not consider all of the subtleties  of the 
network). Without apparently settling these conflicts, CEMM neverthe-
less  set common objectives, recalling the necessity to put the RER into 
operation in 2018, based on the 2015 intermediate scenario. The politi-
cal stakeholders  were aware of the coordination difficulties  and sought 
other ways  to come to an agreement, either via  the creation of a ‘met-
ropolitan community’ [Vanwynsberghe, 2013], which would hold  the 
meeting between the three Regions related to mobility in particular – 
but not explicitly to the RER – or via a new ‘subsidiary in which the 
three Regions  and the federal state would be represented’, created 
within SNCB to ‘manage the operation’ of the RER [government state-
ment by Elio Di Rupo, December 2011, p. 27]. More recently, the dis-
cussions  on the new SNCB 2013-2025 ten-year plan once again cast 
doubt on the imminent arrival of the RER and recalled the importance 
of the budgetary factor and the lack of determination of the public cor-
poration regarding this project. The amounts  of infrastructure invest-
ments  were reduced, works  were delayed indefinitely and others were 
not mentioned even when the CEMM had ratified them. On this occa-
sion, SNCB  also affirmed that some of the objectives of the RER had 
already been met by the IC/IR plan, distorting the project, which pro-
vided an additional service with respect to the existing one. There were 
many criticisms regarding this  ten-year plan, such as those made by 
the Brussels government, but the SNCB  CEOs  stood up for them-
selves: in a context of budgetary scarcity, the priority must be the safe-
guarding of the railway. Furthermore, they said that the railway was  not 
intended to be a ‘taxi’.42
20. In this  strained context, potentially alternative projects  also entered 
the public debate. Without going into detail here about the ‘Brabantnet’ 
tram network project43  of the Flemish regional public transport com-
pany De Lijn, which also aims  to ease congestion in Brussels, let us 
mention the proposals by Jannie Haek,44 head of SNCB-Holding, which 
were probably inspired by the Réseau Express  Bruxellois (REB) project 
by Brussels  ecologists. This project was based on the existing infra-
10
41 ‘RER : Un retard de trois ans suite à l’arrêt du Conseil d’Etat?’, Le Soir, 19 February 2010.
42 Cf. the debate on the SNCB Plan d’Investissement Pluriannuel before the Commission Infrastructure of the Brussels Parliament of 22 May 2013; Baele, M., ‘Le train pour booster la 
mobilité dans Bruxelles? Impossible, dit la SNCB’, RTBF info, 23 May 2013. Available online at:
 www.rtbf.be/info/regions/detail_le-train-pour-booster-la-mobilite-dans-bruxelles-impossible-dit-la-sncb?id=8001244
43 See http://www.delijn.be/mobiliteitsvisie2020/pegasus_vlaamsbrabant/index.htm
44 Renette, E., ‘Une alternative ferroviaire au RER’ and ‘Une petite ceinture version rail’, Le Soir, 19 April 2013; ‘RER : la proposition de la SNCB déplait’, La Libre, 19 April 2013. 
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Figures 3 & 4. Réseau Express Bruxellois (REB) project by Brussels ecologists. Source: Ecolo-Groen, 2013.
structure (at first)  and proposed two lines  in Brussels (from Moensberg 
to the centre and from Berchem to the centre), stopping at existing sta-
tions, which were often underused according to Ecolo/Groen. By mak-
ing use of lines  26, 25 and 50 mainly, the REB would provide a train 
service every fifteen minutes, connecting many municipalities  of Brus-
sels. The REB would require relatively limited investments  and is  pre-
sented as being able to provide a  quick solution for the inhabitants  of 
Brussels, complementing the RER, which is  aimed more at commuters. 
This  project is  far from being inconsequential, in as  much as  it has 
given rise to many reactions such as those by the different municipali-
ties  of Brussels, which gave an opinion on a  motion by the ecologists 
(see the maps of the two phases of the project).
21. In a similar yet more urbanistic perspective, a reflexive and artistic 
process lasting two years, initiated by the non-profit association Recy-
clart and Congress, with the Brussels  Region chief architect and the 
Agence de développement territorial, led to the presentation of a ‘Mani-
feste Jonction’ on 12 December 2013, which returned to the idea of 
two loops (called ‘butterfly’ loops  due to their shape) bypassing the 
North-South junction eastwards  and westwards, favourable to the de-
velopment of a  RER within Brussels  and of a  polycentric city.45 It also 
promoted renovation on the surface and under the junction and imag-
ined an easier crossing of Brussels  by international trains, all in a per-
spective of ‘taking over’ the entire problem by the Brussels regional 
authorities.
12
45 During their presentation, the authors of the manifesto referred explicitly to the firm 51N4E, which first developed this idea in the framework of the study ‘Bruxelles 2040’, conducted in 
2011 at the request of BCR, and which was the object of an exhibit at the Brussels Centre for Fine Arts in 2012.
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Figure 5. The two ‘butterfly’ loops bypassing the North-South junction east-
wards and westwards. Source: Manifeste Jonction (www.jonction.be), 2013.
Conclusion 
22. The RER is  a complex issue, marked by important social, political 
and economic challenges. It first appeared to be emblematic of the 
political antagonism in a country marked by dissociated federalism 
[Delpérée, 2011; Delwit and Pilet, 2004], based on the federated enti-
ties' opposed strategies  of attractiveness. The uses  which the RER is 
intended to favour and the visions  of Brussels at stake are clearly at 
odds and do not appear to be overtaken by the project at this stage. 
Furthermore, to the extent that it involves – beyond sectoral transport 
policies which are already very complex in themselves  – thinking about 
other related public actions and therefore developing desectoralisation 
strategies, the RER issue is becoming more complicated. Comparative 
reflections  on the use of the railway and environmental concerns 
prompt the coordination of actions  between transport and land-use 
planning [Gauthier, 2005], but political will seems to be lacking in order 
to adopt desectoralised and coherent strategies in the area. 
23. Furthermore, the RER issue is  also shaped by different dimensions 
whose logic and temporality have difficulty fitting together. The logic of 
expertise of consulting firms and the world of technicians and engineers 
in transport companies  are not necessarily in keeping with the tempo-
rality of politicians and their logic of decision, often part of processes 
which also accelerate and slow down at times. The transport operator 
SNCB has  its own strategies, which unquestionably favour what it con-
siders  to be its  core business  as  a ‘federal’ company. Added to this are 
societal logics  in terms  of travel, residential locations  and others, which 
are of course related to policies  and transport infrastructures, but also 
have their own dynamics. Finally, this issue testifies  to a  compromise 
which is  perhaps typically Belgian, as  the questions related to works, 
heavy infrastructure and rolling stock have been resolved at least in 
part, before settling the more sensitive aspects of the actual transport 
service as  well as  related policies  which must regulate its  use. It is  as 
logical as  building a machine before knowing exactly what it will be 
used for. This is  probably the power or at least ‘the character of misun-
derstandings’ [Offner, 2012]. Opposition and uncertainty still exist, pre-
cisely because they allow each stakeholder to hope that their own vi-
sions will triumph some day. 
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